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Abstract 
Non-performing loans has become an important part of commercial banking of a country. This paper empirically tests 
the macroeconomic and bank-specific covariates of non-performing loans for a panel of 13 commercial banks for period 
of 2003-2012. Using fixed effects with Driscoll and Kraay standard errors, the influence of macroeconomic and bank-
specific covariates is found meaningful. Recommendations include the policy steps to complement the sound financial 
system with a healthy macroeconomic environment to reduce non-performing loans in commercial banks in Pakistan. 
Moreover, need is highlighted for a policy approach with emphasis on the apposite credit culture and lending policy 
designed with pertinent economic and financial factors. 
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1. Introduction  
It is a common consensus that amount of nonperforming loans (NPL) linked with 
bank failure and financial erosion in both developing countries as well as in developed 
countries. Apart from bank’s profitability, economic conditions of the country also affect 
NPLs. Saunders & Cornett (2006) suggest that the very nature of banking business is 
sensitive because more than 85% of the liability of banks is deposits. The basic function 
of the banks is credit creation and banks perform this function by using the deposit 
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amounts of their customers. Credit creation activity is actually a revenue generating 
process which enables bank to create not only revenues for the banks but also exposes 
banks to dangerously high risk which consequently lead to financial erosion and 
bankruptcy. 
Literature on interactions between the macroeconomy and financial sector traces 
back to King and Plosser (1984), Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Kiyotaki and Moore 
(1997) and Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1998). Pesaran, Schuermann, Treutler and 
Weiner (2006) develop a framework linking the valuechanges of a credit portfolio to a 
dynamic global macro-econometric model. They find that the relationship between the 
firms and the business cycle is the maindriver of default probabilities.In a developing 
country like Pakistan, NPLs had an increase of 54.3% during 2008-2011. Such an increase 
in NPLs cannot be overlooked in the light of existing literature on NPLs and its 
association with macroeconomy. To address this contemporary issue, this paper 
empirically tests the covariates of NPLs that include macroeconomic variables as well as 
bank-specific variables of commercial banks. Macroeconomic variables include interest 
rate, GDP and inflation while bank-specific variables market share of the bank in the 
banking market, return on assets of bank, return on equity and statuary liquidity 
requirements. 
 
1.1 Objectives of the Research 
This research undertakes the empirical scrutiny of impact of macroeconomic 
factors and bank specific variables on non-performing loans in banking industry of 
Pakistan. Accordingly, the hypothesis is built as follows: 
 
HA: Non-performing loans are influenced by macroeconomic conditions and bank specific variables of 
banking industry of Pakistan. 
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 2. Literature Review 
Following is brief review of existing literature on NPLs. From competition point 
of view, Koskela (2000) shows that more competition generates lower loans and so tend 
to higher investments and less chances of bankruptcy. Another study of Baba (2001) using 
real option theory shows that some banks have uncertainties in writing off the 
nonperforming loans such as they are not sure the releasing of funds by writing off or 
their liquidation cost or the expected possible subsidy schemes by the government. These 
factors encourage banks to hold on in writing off NPLs. Matutes (2002) show if the 
competition is less it would certainly lead higher loans and so the chances of bankruptcy. 
According to them, monopoly plays a vital role in monitoring the clients and so increasing 
the outputs while a less monopolistic or less powered institutions cannot achieved as such 
results. 
Salas and Saurina (2002) investigated that GDP expansion and credit smoothness 
to borrowers, institutional size and power and capital ratio create variations in 
Nonperforming loans. Hu et al. (2004) researched between the ownership structure of 
commercial banking and nonperforming loans and told that banks under the supervision 
of government create less nonperforming loans. Similarly the research of Jimenez and 
Saurina (2005) has proved that GDP growth and smooth credit terms along with flexible 
interest rates also affect the nonperforming loans. Fofack (2005) also finds that the 
nonperforming loan can be determined by different factors e.g. GDP, interest rate, 
exchange rate, net interest margins, interbank loans etc. this author describes the strong 
link between the macroeconomic factors and nonperforming loans.  
Accordingly to Boyd and de Nicolo (2005) concentration-stability is that 
institutional power which generates higher profits and as a result creates more stability is 
at least incomplete because it ignores the effects of market power and of the cost of the 
loans on borrower’s behavior. The high interest rates charged by the banks would lead 
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the films that take loans to assume higher risks, which would consequently increase 
systematic risk. Beck et al. (2006) found that in more concentrated banking markets, 
happening of crises are less even after controlling for differences in regulatory policies, 
environment of institutions, macroeconomic conditions and shocks. While in 
concentration-fragility, more concentrated banking structure means more films/weak it 
will be.  
Further studies on concentration stability and fragility include Demirguc-Kunt& 
Levine (2000), Beck et al. (2006), Chang et al. (2008) and Uhde & Heimeshoff (2009) 
describe two different hypotheses that explain the relationship of concentration stability 
in the banking, one hypotheses is the concentration stability and the other hypotheses is 
the concentration fragility. The concentration stability means that a banking system 
consisting of small banks and low concentration is more probable to financial erosion 
than a banking system consisting of few large banks. On the other hand, hypotheses of 
concentration fragility means that a more concentrated banking system is always 
considered as more fragile. 
Maggi and Guida (2009) model the effect of the non-performing loans on the cost 
structure of the commercial banking system. They stress that traditional efficiency 
indicators of cost elasticity do not fit properly with such a problem and propose a measure 
based on the costs for managing and monitoring the loans which, according to the related 
density function, will reveal effectively as non-performing. Swamy (2012) using panel 
data techniques examined the impact of macroeconomic and endogenous factors on non-
performing assets during 1997-2009. He finds the lending rates insignificant in affecting 
the non-performing loans, which is contrary to the general perception. Such assets have 
a negative and significant influence, indicating that large banks may have better risk 
management procedures and technology which definitely allows them to finish up with 
lower levels of non-performing assets compared to smaller banks. 
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Comprehension of these studies highlights that non-performing loans can be 
influenced by macroeconomic factors and bank specific variables. Research on the same 
is absent in case of Pakistan. It is worthwhile to conduct a similar empirical inquiry for 
banking sector of Pakistan. Therefore, this paper tries to fill this gap in literature. 
 
3. Descriptive Analysis 
Following table reveals the Jarque-Bera statistics and their probability values that 
allow to explore normality condition of the data. For all Jarque Bera statistics, the 
corresponding p-values are greater than 0.05. Null hypothesis of normal distribution is 
not rejection and the population residual (μ) is normally distrbuted which fulfills the 
assumption of a good regression line. In this case, the dataset appears in both cross-
sections and time dimension. So, panel data regression estimates are suitable in this case. 
 
Table 1: Normality Test 
Variables NPL MS ROA ROE SLR GDP INF INTI 
Observations 130 130 130 130 130 130 130 130 
Jarque-Bera 2.77 1.59 3.36 3.42 2.59 4.24 4.31 1.98 
p-value 0.25 0.45 0.19 0.18 0.27 0.12 0.11 0.37 
Author’s Estimates using Eviews 7.2  
  
 
4. Schematic Flow of Hypothesized Relationship 
The dependent and independent variables can be linked as depicted in the 
following flowchart. Macroeconomic factors and bank specific variables collectively 
determine the level of non-performing loans in the banking sector of Pakistan. 
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Figure 1: Schematic flow of Expected Relationships 
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4.1 Estimable Model 
In order to conduct empirical estimation of relationship between the variables we 
develop a function as follows: 
NPL = f (MS, ROA, ROE, SLR, M)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .(1) 
Here MS is market share of bank in the loan market, ROA is return on bank assets, 
ROE is return on bank’s equity and SLR is statutory liquidity requirement of banks. M 
is the set of macroeconomic factors. M vector includes interest rate, GDP and inflation 
rate. All of these variables are hypothesized to affect NPLs of sample commercial banks 
in Pakistan.† 
Econometric specification of this function is as follows: 
ln(NPLi,t) = μi + δt + β1ln(MSi,t) + β2ROAi,t + β3ROEi,t+ β4ln(SLRi,t) + β5ln(GDP) + β6 INF + β7 INTI + 
εi,t . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .(1.e) 
 
†𝑵𝑷𝑳 =  
𝑪𝒖𝒓𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒚𝒆𝒂𝒓 𝑵𝑷𝑳 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒗𝒊𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏−𝑷𝒓𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒐𝒖𝒔 𝒚𝒆𝒂𝒓 𝑵𝑷𝑳 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒗𝒊𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏
𝑪𝒖𝒓𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒚𝒆𝒂𝒓 𝑵𝑷𝑳 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒗𝒊𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏
 × 𝟏𝟎𝟎 
𝑴𝑺 =  
𝑻𝒐𝒕𝒂𝒍 𝒍𝒐𝒂𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒆𝒂𝒄𝒉 𝒃𝒂𝒏𝒌
𝑻𝒐𝒕𝒂𝒍 𝒍𝒐𝒂𝒏 𝒐𝒇 𝒂𝒍𝒍 𝒃𝒂𝒏𝒌𝒔 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒂𝒎𝒑𝒍𝒆 𝒔𝒊𝒛𝒆
 × 𝟏𝟎𝟎  
𝑵𝑷𝑳 =  
𝑵𝒆𝒕 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒇𝒊𝒕 𝒂𝒇𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒂𝒙
𝑻𝒐𝒕𝒂𝒍 𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒕𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒃𝒂𝒏𝒌
  
𝑹𝑶𝑬 =  
𝑵𝒆𝒕 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒇𝒊𝒕 𝒂𝒇𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒕𝒂𝒙
𝑺𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒆 𝒉𝒐𝒍𝒅𝒆𝒓′𝒔 𝒆𝒒𝒖𝒊𝒕𝒚
  
 
39                                                               Bilal Mehmood /Journal of Emerging Economies and Islamic Research Vol.1  No.3 (2013) 
Where number of observations: n = N × T (number of groups × temporal 
observations) ∀i∈ [1,N] and ∀ t ∈ [1,T].μiand δt capture the unobserved country-specific 
effects and time-specific effects, respectively, and εi,t is the error term and is assumed to 
be i.i.d. null mean and variance equal to 𝝈𝛆
𝟐. 
 
4.2 Data 
The data used in this study is a panel data consisting of 13 banks for the period of 
2003-2012. The time period for data and selection of banks is dependent on the 
availability of data. The information and all the data of all the variables have been 
collected from the World Development Indicators (WDI) and annual reports (Income 
statements and balance sheets) of the commercial banks. 
 
5. Panel Data Estimation 
For estimation of the panel dataset, following sequence of tests is followed in 
subsections below. 
 
5.1 Test for Multi-Collinearity 
First econometric concern is to check the existence of multi-colliearity among the 
independent variables. As a general rule, if the variance inflation factors (VIFs) of 
variables exceed 10, which usually happens when R2 exceeds 0.90, it shows the existence 
of severe multi-collinearity. VIF of the explanatory variables reported in the Table 2 are 
lower (less than 5.05) than the threshold level and thus it is less likely to have multi-
collinearity in our estimation.  
If there is heterogeneity among sample banks (different characteristics like 
organizational structure and working environment etc.) OLS shall be incomplete 
specification and fixed/random effects model should be estimated. Following two tests 
are instrumental in making suitable estimation technique for panel data analysis. 
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 5.2 Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian Multiplier Test for Random Effects or OLS 
This post-estimation test helps in choosing between random effects regression and 
a simple OLS regression. The null hypothesis in the LM test is that variances across 
countries (𝜎𝜇
2) is zero or no panel effect (significant difference across countries) exists. 
Here the significance of ?̅?2 indicates the presence of panel (fixed or random) effects. 
 
5.3 Hausman Test 
This post-estimation test allows choosing between fixed or random effects model. 
The results of both approaches have been estimated and then subjected to this test. The 
criteria for selecting the better of the two effects is comparison of probability value i.e. if 
p-value is less than 1%, 5% and 10% then fixed effects model is better specification for 
panel data estimation. The probability value of χ2 is less than 0.05 which implies the test 
is significant and Ho is rejected and fixed (systematic) effects model is more suitable. 
Three tests in subsections 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3 are tabulated as follows: 
 
Table 2: Tests for Panel Data Estimation Technique 
Test for Multi-
collinearity 
Schematic Selection of Panel Data Estimation Technique 
Variable VIF 𝟏 𝐕𝐈𝐅⁄  
Breusch-Pagan 
Lagrange Multiplier 
(LM) 
Hausman Test: Choice between Fixed or 
Random Effects MS 1.19 0.84 
ROA 1.99 0.50 [Ho:𝝈𝝁
𝟐  = 0] 
Null Hypothesis: No 
panel effect. 
Hypothesis: 
Ho: Difference in coefficients not 
systematic. 
HA: Difference in coefficients systematic. 
ROE 2.33 0.43 
SLR 4.60 0.22 
GDP 2.24 0.45 ?̅?𝟐(01) 739.23 Value Decision 
INF 5.05 0.20 
p-val> F 0.000 
p-val> χ2 
= 0.0012 
Since p-val> χ2 > 0.05 as well 
as 0.01 fixed effects model is 
preferred 
INTI 1.23 0.81 
Mean VIF 2.66 - 
STATA 12.0 vif 
command 
STATA 12.0 xttest0 
command 
STATA 12.0 xtreg and Hausman 
commands 
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On being affirmed about the estimation technique for panel data, the model established 
in subsection 4.1 is estimated and its results are tabulated and interpreted as under: 
Table 3: Regression Model Estimations 
Dependent Variable is NPL 
Regressors 
I II 
Fixed Effects Estimation 
(Ordinary Least Square, OLS) 
Fixed Effects Estimation with 
Driscoll and Kraay standard 
errors 
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Market Share of Bank in 
the Loan Market 
(MSi,t) 
-0.7762 
(0.0819) 
0.000 
-0.7761 
(0.1236) 
0.000 
Return on Bank Assets 
(ROAi,t) 
-0.1192 
(0.0478) 
0.014 
-0.1191 
(0.0307) 
0.000 
Return on Bank’s Equity 
(ROEi,t) 
-0.4897 
(0.2901) 
0.091 
-0.4895 
(0.4991) 
0.328 
Log of Statutory 
Liquidity Requirement of 
Banks 
(LSLRi,t) 
-53.0820 
(12.3848) 
0.000 
-53.0810 
(18.1744) 
0.004 
Log of Gross Domestic 
Product 
(LGDPi,t) 
-0.2927 
(0.1885) 
0.123 
-0.2929 
(0.2744) 
0.287 
Inflation Rate 
(INFi,t) 
2.5935 
(3.4182) 
0.462 
2.5933 
(4.5598) 
0.570 
Interest Rate 
(INTi,t) 
2.0444 
(0.7572) 
0.000 
2.0447 
(0.6742) 
0.003 
Intercept 
C 
-10.4253 
(16.7607) 
0.540 
-10.4251 
(17.9728) 
0.563 
 R2 0.4102 R2 0.4102 
Adjusted R2 0.3796 Adjusted R2 0.3796 
F(7, 101) 3.02 Wald χ2(7) 557.70 
p-val> F 0.0064 p-val> χ2 0.000 
Model Specification 
Tests 
Ramsey Test 
Ho: Model has no omitted 
variables 
F(3, 109) =     
102.47 
p-val> F =      
0.215 
linktest (Single-equation 
estimation) xtreg [, fe] 
_hat p-val = 0.096 > 
0.000 
_hatsq p-val = 0.237 > 
0.000 
Notes: 
i. Parentheses contain standard errors. 
ii. Commands in STATA 12.0 xtreg [, fe] for Fixed Effects Estimation (Ordinary Least Square, 
OLS) xtscc [, fe] for Fixed Effects Estimation with Driscoll and Kraay standard errors. 
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5.4 Fixed Effects Estimates 
The model is estimated to be an overall significant model. F statistic with its p-
value verifies this. The coefficients of the regressors are as expected in theory. Market 
share (MS) is found to be significant and reduces the non-performing loans (NPL) by 0.77 
units when increased by 1 unit or reduces the non-performing loans (NPL) by 7.7 units 
when increased by 10 units. Similarly, return of assets (ROA) decrease NPL by 1.1 units 
when increased by 10 units. NPL shows a negative relationship of magnitude 4.8 units in 
response to 10 units fall in return of equity (ROE). Statuary liquidity ratio (SLR) 
decreases the NPL by 0.53 (53.08 ÷ 100) when raised by 1 unit. Division of the coefficient 
of SLR by 100 is necessitated due to linear-log model. Gross domestic product (GDP) 
has a similar impact as the above-mentioned regressors. Precisely stating, GDP curtails 
NPL by 2.92 units if increased by 10 units. MS and LSLR are statistically sufficient at 
1% (automatically at 5% and 10% as well). While ROA is statistically significant at 5% 
and 10% and ROE and GDP are only statistically significant 1%. 
On the other hand, both rate regressors [inflation rate (INF) and interest rate 
(INT)] are showing positive relationship with NPL. A decrease of 1 unit each in INF and 
INT decreases the NPL by 2.59 and 2.04 units and vice versa. Existence of intercept 
reveals the existence of a non-proportional relationship though it is not found to be 
statistically significant. Value of R2 is substantive i.e. 0.41, which is high enough for such 
type of unfinished model – A regression model contains an error term that includes 
unexplained variation, hence the model remains an unfinished model with some or many 
missing/unknown independent variables. 
Findings in this study conform to other studies in Asian countries including India 
and Bangladesh. For instance, Ahmed (2006), Beck et al. (2006), Tabak et al. (2007), 
Khemraj & Pasha (2009) and Misra & Dhal (2010). For testing model specification, 
Ramsey test for possibility of omitted variables and linktest for single equation model, 
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are applied. Both Ramsey test statistic and estimated hat-square in linktest are 
insignificant, implying correct specification of the model. 
 
5.4.1 Test for Serial Correlation 
Serial correlation in case of micro panels (with years less than 20) is usually not 
expected. In technical terms, serial correlation renders standard errors of coefficients 
smaller than their actual values and inflates R2. This paper deals with micro panel data (t 
= 13 > 20), this mitigates the likeliness of serial correlation test. But for the sake of 
exactness, test is applied. Interestingly, statistic in table 3 show that null hypothesis is 
rejected (p-val< 0.05 & p-val< 0.01) and it can be inferred that there is serial correlation 
among residuals. Consequently, OLS coefficients are likely to be biased, inconsistent and 
inefficient.  
 
5.4.2 Test for Heteroskedasticity 
 The error term ε can be heteroskedastic if variance of the conditional distribution 
of εi given Xi [var(εi|Xi)] is non-constant for i = 1, 2,…, n, and specifically does not 
depend on X; else, ε is homoscedastic.” Heteroskedasticity can result in wrong estimates 
of standard errors for coefficients and hence of their t‐values. While the estimates of OLS 
might not be biased in this case, standard errors do become wrong. Results show that null 
hypothesis is rejected (p-val< 0.05) and it can be concluded that residuals are not 
homogeneous. Consequently, the estimates of standard errors for coefficients and 
therefore their t‐values are unlikely to be correct. Tests in subsections 5.4.1 and 5.4.2 are 
tabulated as follows: 
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Table 4: Tests for Serial Correlation and Heteroskedasticity in Fixed Effects Regression 
Wooldridge Test for Serial Correlation Modified Wald Test for Group Wise 
Heteroskedasticity 
Wooldridge Test Modified Wald Test 
Ho: No First Order Serial Correlation Ho:𝝈𝒊
𝟐 = 𝝈2 for all i 
F(1, 11) 426.214 χ2 (12) 2752.70 
p-val> F 0.000 p-val> χ2 0.000 
STATA 12.0 xtserial command STATA 12.0 xttest3 command 
 
5.5 Fixed Effects Estimates with Driscoll and Kraay Standard Errors 
Results of Wooldridge test for serial correlation and Modified Wald test for group-
wise Heteroskedasticity call for the fixed effects regression with Driscoll and Kraay 
standard errors (S.E) as in column II in table 4. The error structure is supposed to be 
heteroskedastic, autocorrelated up to some lag and possibly correlated between the 
countries. Recent applications of fixed Driscoll and Kraay standard errors include 
Mehmood, Shahid & Ahsen (2013) and Mehmood & Mustafa (2013). Estimations in this 
paper reveal no upsetting change as compared to results of fixed effects estimates. Only 
t-ratios have marginally changed due to new Driscoll and Kraay standard errors causing 
negligible change in p-values but none in statistical significance. The command in 
STATA for this variant of fixed effects regression is ‘xtscc’. More specifically, impact of 
macroeconomic and bank-specific covariates has survived the new standard error 
structure model. 
 
6. Conclusion  
This paper indicates that banks used different credit risk management tools and 
assessment models to administer their credit risk and that they all have one main objective 
that is to reduce the level of nonperforming loans which is actually a principal cause of 
bank failure. The paper has also proved that banks with sound credit management policies 
do not only earn high incomes (high interest) and they also have lower quantum of bad 
loans (NPLs). It is revealed that institutions with regulated credit management can better 
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absorb credit losses. Role of macroeconomic conditions cannot be over looked in case of 
sample commercial banks in Pakistan.  
Findings of this paper highlight the need for apolicy approach with emphasis on 
 the apposite credit culture and lending policy designed with pertinent economic and 
financial factors. The macroeconomic effect on non-performing loans could be coped 
with suitable terms of lending in terms of maturity, loan interest rate and capital 
requirement.In a nut shell, a healthy macroeconomic performance and sound financial 
sector can lead towards a curtailed amount of non-performing loans. 
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